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1 Meaning in mathematical propositions.
Imagine someone demands from us a proof that 1 + 1 = 2. Certainly, our
reaction will depend on whether we are asked by a child or a mathematician.
While in the former case we can act by showing that one coin put together
with another coin, when counted again are two coins. In the latter case,
it is not clear what we are meant to show. Is a syntactic calculation in an
abstract setting showing the truth about acausal, nontemporal, and non-
spatial objects what is required?
Consider again the child learning arithmetic. At what point, does she
grasp the same truth the mathematician is trying to prove in her theorems.
Or is it necessary to be familiar with Peano Axioms and first order logic
to understand the true meaning of 1 + 1 = 2? We become bewitched by
what we believe lies behind the symbols. It seems like the meaning of the
mathematical proposition is covered by some fog and dispersing the fog is
the work of the mathematician.
But what is meaning in the first place? How do symbols, for example
words, acquire meaning? We follow Wittgenstein in ascribing meaning to a
large class of words as the way we use the word in language. For example,
the meaning of the word "table" is not a mental or physical representation
of a four legged object; the meaning of the word table is the way in which
we use it as in "Put the essay on the table" or "The data is shown in table
one". We can only say we understand the meaning of the sentence if, in the
former sentence we act by putting the essay on the table, and in the latter
by looking at the correct place. If someone says "I feel very table." we will
demand some explanation as the words are used in a manner which do not
fit any use that we are aware of. We do not understand the use of the word
table in that context. The meaning goes astray.
Can this idea of meaning be taken to mathematics? Or in other words: is
the use of the mathematical proposition what gives them meaning? An anal-
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ysis between empirical statements and mathematical propositions is needed
here. The truth of a mathematical proposition is independent of any empiri-
cal phenomena. The use of mathematical prepositions supports this premise.
For example, if we see two drops of water coming together and forming one,
we are not tempted to claim that 1+1 = 2 is false. Rather, we conclude that
this is not an example where we can use the proposition 1+ 1 = 2. Imagine
that actually all objects behave in this peculiar way by sometimes merging
sometimes splitting such that the proposition 1+1 = 2 can never be used in
the physical world. In that case, the truth or falseness of arithmetic propo-
sitions will not matter anymore as the whole use of arithmetic will reduce
to that of a game of symbols. While the truth or falseness of mathematical
proposition are independent of empirical phenomena, the sense (or meaning)
of mathematical propositions is not.
The fact is that nature does not behave in this way and that empirical
regularities appear constantly. We as humans become aware of this brute
fact and act accordingly. We employ initially the symbols to show the reg-
ularity and then "harden" them into mathematical propositions. This is the
mathematical practice. The mathematicians job is to see that a stick used to
measure the length of the objects can become a ruler. The usefulness then
of mathematics relies on us behaving the same way when presented with
the same ‘mathematically’ related situations (arranging, sorting, recognis-
ing shapes, performing one-to-one correspondences, and so forth.) This is
not an agreement of opinion, but an agreement in what being a human is.
This is what gives mathematics its objectivity.
2 Physics is an empirical science.
Physics is the empirical science concerned with the behaviour of inanimate
matter. The term empirical science refers to the fact that physics relies solely
in the ability to test claims about the world with an experiment. Neverthe-
less, physics is a word and therefore has different meanings depending the
use of it in different contexts. For example, we can also describe physics to
be what physicist do. Before getting into a loop and describe a physicist
as someone who does physics, we can define a physicist as those members
of society which work in physics departments and receive funding to do
physics. In this context, physics is defined as anything this group of people
do. These two meanings are interwoven but they are not equivalent. Our
first definition describes an activity, the second one describes an activity
done by certain people.
If we are interested in our first definition of physics, we may ask: how is
theoretical physics possible with the picture of mathematical propositions
presented above? A problem seems to appear: if mathematics are hard-
ened empirical regularities what are the mathematical symbols theoretical
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physicist use to describe ‘yet to be found’ empirical regularities?
The problem can be resolved by changing our view toward the tools a
theoretical physicist use. The objective of a theoretical physicist is not only
to find rules that agree with empirical data but ways to find new empirical
data. The way one achieves this is nowhere regulated. Therefore, theoreti-
cal physics is a no-man’s-land in the junction of mathematics, physics and
philosophy where everything is allowed as far as one is able to make accurate
predictions. In this sense the mathematical symbols a theoretical physicist
uses is an extremely useful and unregulated symbol game that differs from
mathematics even if the symbols used are the same.
If the more sociological point of view towards physics is taken then the-
oretical physics is defined by the practitioners. Is this then just a matter
of agreement between a community? Compare with the mathematicians ac-
cepting something is proven: what the community is agreeing to is not an
opinion but an agreement in the same way of acting (analogous to the way:
we breath the same, our hearts beat the same). Nevertheless, are the agree-
ments in the case of theoretical physicist equally grounded as in the case
of the mathematicians? The distinction between them is a philosophical
task that must be done in order to avoid misunderstanding. Mathematical
meaning can go astray too.
3 Ordinal arithmetic and String theory.
The discussion above provides initial ideas about how theoretical physics and
mathematics can be discussed in terms of use and meaning. The main shift
one would like to achieve is to move from the dichotomy of "true" and "false"
propositions to the notions of "sense" and "nonsense". What one needs to see
is the background (or context) which allow both activities to have meaning.
In particular, there are two examples which provide a formidable starting
point of analysis: "Ordinal Arithmetic" and "String theory".
Ordinal arithmetic seems to put heavy tension on the claims made be-
fore. Where is the empirical regularity that makes ordinal arithmetic true?
The temptation to make this question must be avoided. We need to ask:
"Where is the empirical regularity that makes ordinal arithmetic to have
sense?", or "How is ordinal arithmetic used?". The analysis then should go
to understand the connections between ordinal arithmetic and the rest of
mathematics. Notice that the relevance of the concept of infinity for the
discussion has been shifted from a metaphysical discussion to a pragmatic
one. The question we are interested in should be: How are we using infinity
in order to have useful statements in ordinal arithmetic? But, what if ap-
plications are lacking and theorems do not have implications to any other
part of mathematics. The answer must be similar to: "What is the use of a
cog that spins vigorously but is not attached to the rest of the machine?"
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String theory provides an excellent case of analysis because of the multi-
plicity of meanings. It is hard to draw a line between what is mathematics
and what is theoretical physics in String theory. However the must im-
portant part is to be sure that there is not mathematical symbols out of
the appropriate context and therefore nonsense. This is what the analysis
should do. The claims that string theory is a part of theoretical physics and
therefore an approach to describe and predict empirical phenomena must be
independent of the mathematical machinery developed. Arguing otherwise
is close to misunderstand the difference between physics and mathematics
(the difference as a human activity). In this case, string theory as a theoret-
ical physical tool can only be evaluated in the light of usefulness to explain
and predict empirical phenomena. An experiment is needed to settle the
question.
The claim that String theory contains mathematical propositions has
also to be carefully analysed. This means that any mathematical propo-
sitions in String theory must be approached with the same mathematical
attitude as when one is doing mathematics. One can not use the freedom of
the theoretical physicists to manipulate the symbols and then claim one has
a rigorous mathematical proposition. That would lead to misunderstand-
ing. However, there might be also the case that String theory is a new kind
of activity which is neither physics, nor mathematics. Only the dialogue
between philosophers, mathematicians and physicists can shed light on this
delicate matter.
The work here presented has taken as a basis the ideas of Ludwig Wittgen-
stein in [1] and [2].
Also the work in [3] was influential for the work.
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